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Consumer Value-Maximizing Sweepstakes & Contests: A Theoretical and
Experimental Investigation
Abstract

Sweepstakes and contests are an extremely common promotional strategy used by firms. The sweepstakes and
contests often differ significantly in the design of reward structure. For example, in 1999, Godiva Chocolates
conducted a sweepstakes where one box of chocolates contained a diamond jewellery. The chance of winning
was 1 in 320,000. In 2000, M&M conducted a contest where the Grand Prize of a $1,000,000 had winning
odds of 1 in 380,000,000 and a million second prizes of a coupon redeemable for a M&M packet had the odds
of 1 in 380. In a contest conducted by Planters in 2000, the first prize too was a $1 m (odds 1 in 5,000,000)
but there were only 100 second prizes of a NFL football jacket with odds of 1 in 50,000. In 1999, Old Navy
conducted a sweepstake where there were 4,552 first prize winners who got $100 gift cards with the odds of
winning 1 in 1,000, the 9,105 second prize of $ 20 gift certificates had odds of 1 in 500 and the 13,660 third
prizes of $10 certificates and 883,476 fourth prizes of $5 had winning odds of 1 in 333 and 1 in 50
respectively. These examples raise the issue of how reward structure would affect consumer valuation and
participation. The objective of this paper is to obtain an understanding of how consumers’ valuation of
sweepstakes varies on the basis of differing consumer segments and the characteristics of the consumers.
Our paper focuses on the decisions pertaining to the reward structure. We examine some commonly used
sweepstakes and provide insights on how consumer valuations depend on the number of winners, the number
of levels of prizes, and the difference in the awards between the levels (reward spread). We follow the
Cumulative Prospect Theory to develop a model for consumer valuations of alternative formats of
sweepstakes. The model applies a S-shaped probability weighting function and a loss-aversion framework for
the consumers who switched to less preferred brands for sweepstakes but eventually did not win any prizes.
We analytically derive our theoretical results and experimentally test some of the key implications.
The results of the model show that the sweepstakes reward structure should be based on three factors: the
objectives of the firm, the risk aversion of the customers, and the level of sub-additivity of probability
weighting. The results of the model prescribes that the firm should begin by setting sweepstake objectives in
terms of either attracting switchers or targeting current users. If the objective is to target current users, then
the number of prizes awarded should be lower than in the case where the targets are switchers. If the current
users are risk neutral, then the consumer value-maximizing award is a single grand prize. If the current users
are risk averse, then the award should consist of multiple “large” prizes. When the firm’s objective is to draw
sales away from competitors, the value-maximizing strategy is to distribute the award money over more prizes.
If the non-current user segment is risk neutral with respect to gains but sufficiently risk averse in the domain
of losses, then the prescribed reward structure is to have a single grand prize but also include several small
prizes which ideally should be close to the opportunity cost of the customers. If the non-loyal customers are
risk averse in gain and loss averse, then the best prize allocation is to have both multiple large prizes as well as
several small prizes.
Another recommendation from the model analysis is that the firm should minimize the number of prizes at
each level. In practice, the costs of implementing and communicating such a prize structure could be high. To
trade-off between the logistical and communication costs and the theoretically value-maximizing approach,
firms could increase the number of prizes at each level for easier implementation. A trade-off is involved
between increasing the attractiveness of the sweepstake and the implementation costs of administering several
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levels of prizes. Often, when the prizes are products rather than cash, the firm may obtain quantity discounts
for the products but the value of the products will be the same for the sweepstake participants.
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Consumer Value-Maximizing Sweepstakes & Contests:
A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation
Abstract
Sweepstakes and contests are an extremely common promotional strategy used by firms. The
sweepstakes and contests often differ significantly in the design of reward structure. For
example, in 1999, Godiva Chocolates conducted a sweepstakes where one box of chocolates
contained a diamond jewellery. The chance of winning was 1 in 320,000. In 2000, M&M
conducted a contest where the Grand Prize of a $1,000,000 had winning odds of 1 in
380,000,000 and a million second prizes of a coupon redeemable for a M&M packet had the
odds of 1 in 380. In a contest conducted by Planters in 2000, the first prize too was a $1 m
(odds 1 in 5,000,000) but there were only 100 second prizes of a NFL football jacket with
odds of 1 in 50,000. In 1999, Old Navy conducted a sweepstake where there were 4,552 first
prize winners who got $100 gift cards with the odds of winning 1 in 1,000, the 9,105 second
prize of $ 20 gift certificates had odds of 1 in 500 and the 13,660 third prizes of $10
certificates and 883,476 fourth prizes of $5 had winning odds of 1 in 333 and 1 in 50
respectively. These examples raise the issue of how reward structure would affect consumer
valuation and participation. The objective of this paper is to obtain an understanding of how
consumers’ valuation of sweepstakes varies on the basis of differing consumer segments and
the characteristics of the consumers.
Our paper focuses on the decisions pertaining to the reward structure. We examine
some commonly used sweepstakes and provide insights on how consumer valuations depend
on the number of winners, the number of levels of prizes, and the difference in the awards
between the levels (reward spread). We follow the Cumulative Prospect Theory to develop a
model for consumer valuations of alternative formats of sweepstakes. The model applies a Sshaped probability weighting function and a loss-aversion framework for the consumers who
switched to less preferred brands for sweepstakes but eventually did not win any prizes. We
analytically derive our theoretical results and experimentally test some of the key
implications.
The results of the model show that the sweepstakes reward structure should be based
on three factors: the objectives of the firm, the risk aversion of the customers, and the level
of sub-additivity of probability weighting. The results of the model prescribes that the firm
should begin by setting sweepstake objectives in terms of either attracting switchers or
targeting current users. If the objective is to target current users, then the number of prizes
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awarded should be lower than in the case where the targets are switchers. If the current users
are risk neutral, then the consumer value-maximizing award is a single grand prize. If the
current users are risk averse, then the award should consist of multiple “large” prizes. When
the firm’s objective is to draw sales away from competitors, the value-maximizing strategy is
to distribute the award money over more prizes. If the non-current user segment is risk
neutral with respect to gains but sufficiently risk averse in the domain of losses, then the
prescribed reward structure is to have a single grand prize but also include several small
prizes which ideally should be close to the opportunity cost of the customers. If the nonloyal customers are risk averse in gain and loss averse, then the best prize allocation is to
have both multiple large prizes as well as several small prizes.
Another recommendation from the model analysis is that the firm should minimize
the number of prizes at each level. In practice, the costs of implementing and communicating
such a prize structure could be high. To trade-off between the logistical and communication
costs and the theoretically value-maximizing approach, firms could increase the number of
prizes at each level for easier implementation. A trade-off is involved between increasing the
attractiveness of the sweepstake and the implementation costs of administering several levels
of prizes. Often, when the prizes are products rather than cash, the firm may obtain quantity
discounts for the products but the value of the products will be the same for the sweepstake
participants.

Key words: Sales promotion, prospect theory, customer loyalty.
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Introduction
The use of sweepstakes and contests as a promotional tool is ubiquitous across several
categories in durables, non-durables and services. According to the Annual Cox Direct 20th
Annual Survey of Promotional Practises, sweepstakes are reported to be used by 73% of the
firms surveyed in 1997 as compared to being used by 63% of the firms in 1993. Firms spend
considerable amounts of their communication budgets on the rewards as well as advertising
the sweepstakes or contests. For example, in 2000, Coke Classic conducted a ‘False Tops’
sweepstakes that included five $1 million cash awards and was promoted using a $15 million
advertising campaign. There is considerable anecdotal evidence suggesting that managers
consider these a very effective tool in generating sales (e.g. Marketing News, 2000). While
there is extensive literature on other promotional devices such as coupons (e.g. Dhar,
Morrison and Raju 1996; Inman and McAlister 1994; Neslin, 1990), despite its prevalence,
very little research has examined as to how consumers respond to sweepstakes promotions.
Consider the following examples of sweepstakes promotions. In 1998, Godiva
Chocolates conducted a “Chocolates and Engagement” sweepstakes where three boxes of
chocolates contained a diamond engagement ring. The odds of winning the ring were 1 in
320,000. In 1999, the promotion was changed to a single piece of diamond jewelry. In 2000,
M&M conducted a contest where the Grand Prize of a $1,000,000 had winning odds of 1 in
380,000,000 and a million second prizes of a coupon redeemable for a M&M packet had the
odds of 1 in 380. In a contest conducted by Planters in 2000, the first prize too was a $1 m
(odds 1 in 5,000,000) but there were only 100 second prizes of a NFL football jacket with
odds of 1 in 50,000. In 1999, Old Navy conducted a sweepstake where there were 4,552 first
prize winners who got $100 gift cards with the odds of winning 1 in 1,000, the 9,105 second
prize of $ 20 gift certificates had odds of 1 in 500 and the 13,660 third prizes of $10
certificates and 883,476 fourth prizes of $5 had winning odds of 1 in 333 and 1 in 50
respectively.
These examples illustrate the wide variation in how the rewards in sweepstakes and
contests are allocated. The number of winners ranges from one in the Godiva (1999)
example to a million and one in the M& M’s case. The number of prize levels awarded also
varies with two in the case of Planters and four prize levels in the case of Old Navy. Further,
the differences in amounts between the levels of prizes are also considerably different. These
examples raise the issue of how reward structure would affect consumer valuation and
participation. To the best of our knowledge, no research has been conducted to address this
issue. The objective of this paper is to obtain an understanding of how consumers valuation
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of sweepstakes differs on the basis of differing consumer segments and the characteristics of
the consumers.
Why are sweepstakes and contests effective in generating consumer response?
Literature investigating people’s incentive to participate in lotteries offers insights in
understanding why sweepstakes may be a useful promotion tool. Friedman and Savage (1948)
argued that people’s utility function was concave up to a point but later becomes convex.
They reasoned that consumers participated in lotteries because winning accorded a possibility
of reaching a state of high income that provided disproportionate benefits. Kwang (1965)
presents an “indivisibility of expenditures” explanation that states that consumer
expenditures cannot be divisible infinitely. If a consumer wished to allocate her resources
between a car and a boat, the option of selecting fractions of the product does not exist: the
customer has to select one of the products. He demonstrates that rational consumers with
limited income wishing to purchase both products will participate in lotteries. Another
argument that explains why people participate in lotteries or sweepstakes is the availability
bias. Usually, a firm’s communication messages emphasize only the winners (e.g. Publishers
Sweepstakes) that increases the availability of the positive consequences of participation in
the consumers’ minds (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Finally, there may be a utility of just
participating in some contests and sweepstakes (Chandon, Wansink and Laurent 2000).
Sweepstakes and contests are similar to lotteries in that both involve a random
drawing process that offers an opportunity to win a prize. The key distinguishing feature of a
sweepstake from a lottery is that no consideration is involved. Consideration implies that the
customer makes a payment to avail being a participant in the drawing. Conducting a lottery
is illegal where a lottery is defined as containing three components: chance, prize and
consideration. To be legal, one of these elements has to be eliminated. Therefore, any
sweepstakes requires that customers can avail of the opportunity to participate by getting an
appropriate form or contest piece free from the firm.
Sweepstakes and contests differ in that while sweepstakes are promotions where only
chance is involved, contests also require some level of effort or skill. Very often, the skill
required in most contests is minimal and does not differentiate between consumers. For
example, in 2000, Folger’s Coffee used print media to promote a contest where consumers
entered into a drawing if they correctly identified a singer who regularly drank Folger’s.
Folgers had provided the answer by using the picture and the name of the singer in an ad on
the adjoining page of the magazine. We use the terms contests and sweepstakes
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interchangeably but our results are applicable only to those contests where the skill or effort
level does not impact the outcome.
Designing a sweepstake or contest promotion involves a number of interrelated
decisions. The elements of a sweepstake design include determining the total reward money
and the allocation of the reward money with respect to the total number of winners and the
split of the reward between them. Other decisions include determining the theme of contest,
kind of prizes (cash or products), the duration and frequency of the sweepstake, whether the
rewards are immediate or delayed and the amount of effort the consumer has to expend in
participating in the sweepstake. In some cases, contests are designed so that the odds of
winning are based on the number of entries received. Therefore, sweepstake contests can be
dichotomized as those that have risky prospects (actual winning odds are announced) and
those with uncertain prospects (actual winning odds are not known and depend on the number
of entries received). In all the motivational examples used earlier, the firm has provided the
odds of winning on the packages.
The focus in this paper is only on the decisions pertaining to the reward structure. We
examine some commonly used sweepstakes and provide insights on how consumer
valuations depend on the number of winners, the number of levels of prizes, and the
difference in the awards between the levels (reward spread). We provide a model for
consumer valuations of alternative formats of sweepstakes and experimentally test some of
the key implications.

Model Development
In this section we set up a model that describes consumer’s valuation of sweepstakes. As our
focus is limited to the design of the sweepstakes structure, we assume the price of the product
to be fixed. We further assume that the firm has allocated a fixed budget of R to be
distributed allocated as prize money to the winners. These assumptions allows us focus on
alternative sweepstake formats i.e. how many winners there should be in a sweepstakes
promotion and how the total reward money should be allocated between them . We let S
denote the prize structure of a sweepstakes promotion where
S = {r1 , m1 ; r2 , m 2 ; ...rn , m n }

(1)

In equation (1) rj denotes the jth prize and mj the number of winners of rj (j =1, 2,…n), both rj
and mj are positive. The number of prize levels is denoted by n. Thus, the sweepstake
defined by (1) offers m1 number of first prize at the amount of r1, m2 number of second prize
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at the amount of r2, and so on. Without any loss of generality, we assume that the prizes
offered are in the form of cash. Given the promotion budget constraint (R), a feasible prize
n

structure for the sweepstakes should satisfy the following conditions: ∑ m j r j = R and
j =1

ri > r j > 0 for any 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n.

Consumer Valuation
Consumers face a decision on whether or not to purchase the brand conducting the
sweepstakes. For expositional simplicity, we assume that each consumer purchases only one
unit and therefore has one chance to win a prize.1 In the rest of the paper, we use the term
‘participate’ in the contest to reflect that the consumer has decided to both purchase the brand
and to avail of the opportunity to win a prize. We do not consider consumers who enter the
sweepstakes without purchasing the brand. Discussion with managers indicates that the
effort cost to enter sweepstakes without purchasing are usually high enough to induce
negligible entry rates.2 To decide whether or not to participate in the sweepstakes, a consumer
(i) has to compare the anticipated value of participation with value of non-participation
defined as follows:
vi ( S )
vi =  0
v i

if consumer i participates in the sweepstakes
if consumer i does not participate in the sweepstakes

(2)

In equation (2), vi (S ) represents the value that consumer i anticipates from the outcome of
sweepstake S defined in equation (1); vi0 represents the value that consumer i would receive
without participating in sweepstakes. Thus, vi0 serves as the reference value that consumer i
should employ in judging the gain and loss from participating in the sweepstakes. The
anticipated gain and loss from the sweepstakes depends on the consumers’ preference for the
brands as well as from the outcome.
We assume that there is heterogeneity in preferences for the brand. For simplicity, we
divide the market into two segments: the first segment is defined as the high-valuation
segment (denoted as i=H), and the second segment as low-valuation (denoted as i=L). The
high-valuation segment consists of consumers who, at the time the sweepstake is conducted,
1

Usually, consumers can purchase multiple units. We assume that the decision to purchase each unit of the
brand is made independently. This is equivalent to analysing the demand by units of product with sweepstakes.
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have a relatively higher preference for the brand relative to the competitors. A number of
reasons have been suggested as to why a firm will target high-valuation consumers with a
promotion even though they are likely to purchase the brand on the occasion the sweepstakes
is conducted. These include increasing consumer consumption through purchase of
additional units or encouraging purchase acceleration (Blattberg and Neslin 1990). Another
reason suggested for promotions is to reward current consumers (Kotler 1997) so as to
increase their brand preferences in future periods and prevent defection (Schultz, Robinson
and Petrison 1998). For example, in 2000, Patek Philippe conducted a sweepstakes targeted
at high valuation customers explicitly advertising that the objective of the sweepstake was to
reward their customers. Only customers who had purchased a Patek watch in the past were
eligible to enter (by providing evidence of owning a Patek such as the movement or reference
number of the watch). U.S Airlines places sweepstakes forms in their in-flight magazines
that are available only to flyers who are already current customers. Such promotions impact
consumer retention by enhancing the valuation of the brand for future purchases. Low
valuation customers prefer competitors’ brands at the time the sweepstake is conducted.
Thus, the primary objective of the sweepstake or contest is to encourage brand switching.
These two segments of consumers anticipate different levels of post-purchase utility.
Since consumers of high-valuation segment will prefer the brand on the particular purchase
occasion with or without the sweepstakes promotion, their reference value ( v H0 ) is same as
the value that they would receive without winning any prizes ( v H (0) ). These consumers will
experience a gain from any prizes that they may win and will not regret their brand choice
decision even if they do not win any prize. In contrast, consumers of the low-valuation
segment will select other alternatives if the sweepstake is not offered as they value the
competing brands more on the particular purchase occasion. Therefore v L0 > v L (0) ; that is,
low-valuation segment’s reference value is higher than the value that they would receive
without winning any prizes. As a result, a low-valuation consumer will gain from purchasing
the firm’s brand only if she wins a prize. If the consumer does not win any prizes, then she
will experience a loss and regret for her purchase decision. Such a loss is the opportunity cost
for the low-valuation consumers. We let τ = v L0 - v L (0) where τ denotes the opportunity
(switching) cost of purchasing the less preferred brand.

2

For example, in the sweepstakes conducted by M&M in 2000, the firm required that a self-addressed stamped
# 10 envelope be sent to obtain the official game form. There was a limit of 1 request per envelope and the
game form was available only “while supplies last”.
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As our focus is on the reward structure, for simplicity, we do not consider important
elements like the utility of participation and the disutility of effort involved in a sweepstake.
Thus, consumers obtain positive utility from the sweepstakes only through the chances to win
prizes. Then, Vi ( S ) , the anticipated values from sweepstake (S) given in equation (1) can be
formulated as follows for the high- and low-valuation segments respectively:
V H ( S ) = V (v H ( S ), v H0 ) =

n

∑ω

j

g ( r j ) + ω 0 g ( 0)

(3)

j =1

V L ( S ) = V (v L ( S ), v L0 ) =

J

∑ ω j g (r j − τ ) −
j =1

n

∑ ω l (τ − r ) − ω l (τ )
j

j

0

(4)

j = J +1

where r j > τ for any 1 ≤ j ≤ J and r j ≤ τ for any J < j ≤ n. Note that prizes r j (J < j ≤ n) are
not large enough to cover the opportunity cost that low-valuation consumers incur. The gain
function g(.) represents the consumer’s valuation of gain and loss function l(.) represents the
consumer’s valuation of loss.3 Decision weights ω j represents the weight that consumers
assign to valuation of prize rj. Naturally, decision weights ω j depends on the odds of
winning the prize rj. Both utility formulation (3) and (4) and above assumptions are standard
in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979 and Tversky and Kahneman 1992). We
next discuss the properties of the loss and gain functions as well as the weighting functions in
more depth.

The Gain and Loss Function
Prospect Theory proposes that both gain function g(.) and loss function l(.) are positive,
monotonically increasing, and concave: g ( x) > 0 , g ′( x) > 0 , g ′′( x) ≤ 0 , l ( x) > 0 , l ′( x) > 0 , and
l ′′( x) ≤ 0 . Moreover, a loss is more significant than a gain of the same amount due to loss-

aversion behaviour; that is, g (x) < l (x) for any positive value of x. The referencedependence model that we use in equation (3) and (4) was originally proposed by Tversky
and Kahneman (1991) and is typical in modelling loss aversion. Loss-aversion behavior has
also been demonstrated in the marketing domain (for examples see Loewenstein and Prelec
1993 and Hardie, Johnson, and Fader 1993).

3

Both gain and loss functions depend on size of prize that consumers receive. We recognize but do not
explicitly model the factor that consumers may not always claim the prizes that they win, particularly when the
prize is small and the transaction cost to receive the prize is high.
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The Weighting Function
In prospect theory, the value of each outcome is multiplied by a decision weight. The
decision weight measures the impact of events on the desirability of prospects, and not
merely the perceived likelihood of these events. Prospect Theory adopts rank-dependent
cumulative decision weighting functions (Quiggin 1982, Tversky and Kahneman 1992, and
Tversky and Wakker 1995).
Consider the case of risk prospects sweepstakes where the consumers know the odds
of winning. For the sweepstakes defined in (1), we denote the total number of product units
with sweepstakes as N 4. The participant’s actual chance to win first prize is m1/N, chance to
win second prize is m2/N, and so on. The cumulative probability for the event of winning at
j

least the jth prize is

∑m
k =1

k

N . The corresponding cumulative decision weights for the event
j

of winning at least the jth prize is ω (∑ mk N ) where ω is cumulative decision weighting
1

function. The decision weight ω j , associated with winning the jth prize (j=1,2….n), is the
difference between cumulative weights of the events winning at least the jth prize and


j





j −1





 k =1



winning at least (j-1)th prize; that is, ω j = ω  ∑ m k N  − ω  ∑ mk N  . For any rank
 k =1

j=1,2….n, we obtain the decision weight ω j associated with winning the jth prize as follows.
ω1 = ω (

 j

 j −1

m1
m + m2
m
) , ω2 = ω( 1
) − ω ( 1 ) , … ω j = ω  m k N  − ω  mk N  , …
N
N
N
 k =1

 k =1


∑



n



 n −1







 k =1



 k =1

n

∑



ω n = ω  ∑ m k N  − ω  ∑ mk N  , and ω 0 = 1 − ω  ∑ mk N 
 k =1



(5)

where ω 0 denotes the decision weight for the event of “not winning any prizes”. In prospect
theory cumulative decision weighting function ω(.) is a s-shaped function as shown in Figure
1, ω (0) = 0 and ω (1) = 1 . Such a weighting function overweights small probabilities and
underweights moderate and high probabilities. The s-shaped weighting function has been
empirically verified by a large number of studies, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Camerer and Ho (1994), and Wu and Gonzalez (1996), etc.
Specific S-shaped functions have also been suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and
4

When consumers do not know the actual number of entries, sweepstakes become uncertain prospects. However
our results will remain the same because essentially N will be replaced by consumers’ expected number of
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Prelec (1998) and further estimated using experimental data by Camerer and Ho (1994) and
Wu and Gonzalez (1996).
Due to the rank-dependent nature of the weighting function, weights of winning large
prizes are evaluated earlier and hence inflated more (relative to actual probabilities).
Therefore, the ratio of decision weight and actual probability of winning a particular prize,
which measures the degree of overweighting the probability of winning, is larger at higher
ranks:
ωj
mj

>

ωk
mk

for any rank j < k

(6)

Consumers’ risk attitude depends on both the value functions and the decision weights.
First, following the standard approach in Prospect Theory, we conceptualise risk aversion
only through the value function. More specifically, a consumer’s risk aversion with gain (loss)
increases with the concavity of gain (loss) function. Second, in order to compare alternative
decision weight functions, we adopt measure of subadditivity (SA) proposed by Tversky and
Wakker (1995). Higher SA is interpreted as an ordering by departure from the actual
probability of the corresponding outcome. This measure is taken independent of value
functions. For example, in Figure 1, ω 1 ( p ) is said to be more SA than ω 2 ( p ) .
Though not the focus of this paper, factors influencing SA are important to investigate
for designing sweepstakes. Several design elements of a sweepstakes can manipulate the
level of sub-additivity. For example, increasing the effort level required to participate (eg.
completing a form or collecting game pieces) could create an illusion of control (Langer
1975) that may increase sub-additivity.
Utilizing the value functions in (3) and (4) and decision weights in (5), the
consumers’ anticipated utility of sweepstakes participation can be characterized as follows:
m 
V H (S ) = ω  1  g (r1 ) +
N 

n

 

j

∑ ω  ∑ m
j =2



k

k =1



 j −1

 n

N  − ω  m k N   g (r j ) + 1 − ω  m k N   g (0) (7)
 k =1


 k =1



∑

∑

J 
 j

 j −1

m 
VL ( S ) = ω  1  g (r1 − τ ) + ∑  ω  ∑ mk N  − ω  ∑ mk N   g (r j − τ ) −
N 
j = 2   k =1

 k =1

n 

 j

 j −1

 n








ω
m
N
ω
m
N
l
(
τ
r
)
1
ω
−
−
−
−
 ∑ mk N  l (τ )
∑
j
∑ k

∑ k



j = J +1   k =1

 k =1

 k =1



(8)

entries formed according to their beliefs on a probabilistic distribution of N. For expositional convenience we
will focus on the case with known odds.

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2002

11

Review of Marketing Science Working Papers, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 2

Value-Maximizing Sweepstakes

As mentioned earlier, our objective is to study the design of sweepstakes that maximize
consumers’ valuation. Corresponding to the objective of the sweepstakes promotion, within
the promotion budget, we aim to investigate sweepstakes that maximize targeted consumers’
anticipated valuation.
max δ H V H (S) + (1 − δ H )V L (S)

(P1)
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where the anticipated value functions Vi (S) (i =H, L) are given in equation (7) and (8).
Parameter δH∈{0,1} indicates the targeting segment, where δH =1 implies that the
sweepstakes is offered to target the high-valuation segment and δH =0 implies that the
sweepstakes is offered to attract the marginal and switching consumers. As we focus on the
design of sweepstakes we also assume that both the price and brand valuation (without the
sweepstake) are predetermined.

Model Analysis

We begin our analysis with the case where the sweepstakes promotion targets the highvaluation segment (δH =1), followed by the case where the sweepstakes promotion targets the
low-valuation segment (δH =0). We examine the prize structure of the sweepstakes that will
be valued most by each target segment. For each case, we draw conclusions on the reward
format in general scenarios as well as scenarios corresponding to specific type of consumers’
risk attitudes. We conclude our analysis with a comparison between the value-maximizing
reward formats for high- and low-valuation segments.

High-Valuation Segment

Problem (P2) solves the value-maximizing sweepstakes for consumers of high-valuation
segment.
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We solve problem (P2) in Appendix 1 and obtain following the equilibrium condition:
ωj
mj

g ′(r j* ) = M *H ( j = 1,2,..n)

(9)

Equilibrium condition (9) states that, in the value-maximizing sweepstakes design, marginal
anticipated value generated from an increase in prize is identical across all ranks that offer
positive prizes. The equilibrium ability to raise anticipated-value of high-valuation consumers
is denoted by M *H , which increases with

ωj
mj

(degree of actual winning probability being

overweighed) and g ′(r j* ) (marginal utility from gain). Intuitively, when an extra prize is
allocated to a rank that has winning probability more overweighed, consumers should
anticipate a larger increase in value of sweepstakes. According to equation (6), the
probabilities of winning higher ranks are more overweighed. However, higher ranks are
associated with larger prizes and hence lower marginal value g ′(.) . Next we discuss the
implications of equilibrium condition (9) on the design of the sweepstakes.

Risk Neutral in Gain
We begin by analysing the value-maximizing format of sweepstakes with the case where
high-valuation consumers are risk neutral in gain. We will later study the implications of risk
aversion. When high-valuation consumers are risk neutral in gain, marginal value of gain
g ′(r j ) becomes constant. Since

ωj
mj

>

ωk
mk

for any j < k (equation (6)), the only solution that

satisfies equilibrium condition (9) is n=1. Moreover, among the sweepstakes that only offer
one level of prize, the value-maximizing solution is to have only one winner because
ω( 1N )
1

N

>

ω ( m1 N )
m1

for any m1>1. We summarize the above result in Proposition 1.1.

N

Proposition 1.1: When high-valuation consumers are risk neutral in gain, the valuemaximizing format of sweepstakes is to offer one grand prize only; that is,
S *H = {r1* = R, m 1* = 1; r *j = 0, j > 1} .

The intuition behind the result of Proposition 1.1 lies in the rank-dependent s-shaped decision
weighting function. Such a decision weighting function overweighs availability of larger
prizes (or higher ranks). Therefore, when high-valuation consumers are risk neutral in gain,
allocating more prize budget to larger prize increases high-valuation consumers’ anticipated

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2002

13

Review of Marketing Science Working Papers, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 2

value for the sweepstakes. Moreover, for a specific high rank, smaller winning probability is
overweighed more. Consequently it is value-maximizing to offer one grand prize only. Next,
we consider the scenario when consumers are risk averse in the domain of gains.

Risk Aversion in Gain
When high-valuation consumers are risk averse, they may prefer sweepstakes that offer
multiple levels of prizes. On one hand, probabilities of winning higher ranks are still
overweighed more. On the other hand, since high-valuation consumers are risk averse in gain,
marginal value from gain g ′(r j ) < g ′(r j +1 ) as r j > r j +1 . Thus, equilibrium condition (9) can
hold for multiple levels of prizes.
To design a sweepstake that offers multiple levels of prizes, the firm needs to decide
the number of winners for each rank of prize {m1 , m2 ,..., mn } and the inter-rank spread
(difference in size of prize between consecutive ranks). First, we find that the valuemaximizing number of winner for each rank of prize is one. (See Appendix 1 for proof). The
intuition behind the results is as follows. Suppose there are two winners for rank j with prize
rj. We divide the total prizes of (2rj) into two ranks, rank j of prize rj+∇r and rank j+1 of
prize rj-∇r. Given a small ∇r, ranks for all other prizes will not be changed. The difference in
the utilities of achieving these ranks, g (r j + ∇r ) - g ( r j ) and g ( r j ) - g (r j − ∇r ) , decreases and
approaches to zero with smaller ∇r. On the other hand, according to equation (6), the chance
to win the jth prize is overweighed strictly more than the chance to win the j+1th prize.
Moreover, the degree of overweighting is independent of the size of ∇r. Therefore there
exists a sufficiently small ∇r so that, by dividing the prizes for two winners of rank j into two
consecutive ranks, one can increase consumer’s anticipated value of sweepstakes. Thus the
consumer value-maximizing prize structure should offer only a single prize at every level.
When a sweepstakes consists of a single prize at every level, equilibrium condition (9)
becomes
 ω  j  − ω  j − 1   g ′(r * ) = M *

  N
H
j
N  


 

(10)

for j = 1,2,..n. Condition (10) implies that, given a decision weighting function (ω), when
high-valuation consumers are more risk averse, they should prefer a sweepstake of smaller
inter-rank ( d *j = r *j − r *j +1 ) and more winners. To see this, note that the ratio of marginal gains
from consecutive ranks ( g ′(r *j ) g ′(r *j +1 ) ) is a constant. When high-valuation consumers are
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more risk averse, their marginal utilities functions become steeper. For a given value of r *j +1 ,
a smaller r *j is required to satisfy condition (10), leading to a smaller inter-rank spread d *j .
From condition (10), we can also see that when the decision-weighting function is more subadditive (SA), the ratio ( g ′(r *j ) g ′(r *j +1 ) ) is required to be smaller. Following a similar line of
reasoning as above, we can conclude that given a fixed level of risk aversion, high-valuation
consumers prefer a sweepstake that has larger inter-rank spread and smaller number of
winners.

Proposition 1.2: If high-valuation consumers are sufficiently risk averse, the valuemaximizing sweepstakes should consist of multiple big prizes. The number of prizes increases
but the inter-rank spread decreases with (a) the increase in consumer risk aversion and (b)
decrease in sub-additivity.
Low-valuation Segment

We now discuss the reward structure of value-maximizing sweepstake when the firm targets
the low valuation segment. A key distinction from the high valuation segment in this case is
that consumers who do not win a prize will experience a loss as they incur an opportunity
cost of not purchasing the brand they prefer on the specific purchase occasion. Problem (P3)
defines the value-maximizing sweepstakes for the low-valuation segment.

(P3)

J
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No Loss if Winning a Prize
Our first finding is that value-maximizing prize structure of the sweepstakes targeting lowvaluation segment should only offer prizes at least as large as opportunity cost τ. If a
consumer does win a prize, she should anticipate either a gain or at least indifference (no gain
and no loss). We state the result in Lemma 1 and provide a formal proof in Appendix 2.
Lemma 1: If the sweepstakes is targeted to the low-valuation segment, the lowest prize
should be at least as large as opportunity cost τ.
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Lemma 1 implies that firms should not offer any prize that is smaller than τ.
Consumers of low-valuation segment will experience no loss (and no gain) if they win the
smallest prize. To see the intuition behind this result, assume that a sweepstakes contains a
bottom prize rn <τ. We find that the low-valuation consumers’ anticipated value from this
sweepstakes increases if we raise the prize rn by a small amount. First, since the loss function
is concave, the marginal utility becomes larger when the size of prize goes increasingly closer
to τ. Second, given the same budget for the sweepstakes contest, an increase in rn leads to a
decrease in the number of winners (mn). A smaller number of last prize winners, hence lower
probability of winning the last prize (while the chance to win all other prizes remain the
same), implies a greater marginal decision weight for the last prize. This is the result of sshaped decision weighting function. Combining these two effects, we can conclude that a
marginal increase in the amount of the last prize towards opportunity switching cost τ will
always increase the low-valuation consumers’ anticipated value for the sweepstakes. In the
rest of analysis on Problem (P3) we will apply the result of Lemma 1.

Equilibrium Condition
According to Lemma 1, in the value-maximizing sales contests offered to low-valuation
segment, all the prizes other than the last prize are larger than the opportunity cost τ. Similar
to our analysis of the high-valuation segment, we now derive the equilibrium conditions for
the value-maximizing sales contests for the low-valuation segment,
S *L = {r1* , m1* ; r2* , m *2 ; ...rn* = τ , m *n } . (Please see Appendix 2 for the derivation.)
ωj
mj

ωn
mn

g ′(r j* ) = M *L ( j = 1,2,..n-1)
l ′(0) ≥ M L* ≥

ωn
mn

g ′(0)

(11)
(12)

Similar to equation (9), equation (11) requires identical anticipated value-generating ability
M *L from the top (n-1) prizes. Consumers will experience gain if they win any of these prizes.

Equilibrium sweepstakes will also contain a bottom prize equal to τ if (12) holds; that is,
anticipated marginal value of loss aversion shall be sufficiently high at the bottom prize.
Since l ′(0) g ′(r ) measure the degree of loss aversion, condition (12) indicates that the valuej
maximizing sweepstakes for the low-valuation consumers should consist of a small prize
when the low-valuation consumers are sufficiently loss averse. Intuitively, since low-
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valuation consumers are loss averse, they anticipate a much higher value of participation if
the chance to experience loss is reduced.

Risk Neutral with Gain Function
Similar to the procedure adopted in the analysis for high-valuation segment, we first examine
the case where the low-valuation segment is risk neutral with respect to gain; that is, g ′(.) is a
constant (while loss function can be either risk averse or neutral). When low-valuation
consumers are risk neutral in gain, we find that the prize structure of value-maximizing
sweepstake consists of only two levels of prize: one larger than opportunity cost (τ) and one
equal to τ. The intuition for the result of one large prize follows the same logic behind
Proposition 1.1. Consider a sweepstakes as defined by equation (1) for the low-valuation
segment. According to Lemma 1, we infer that the first (n-1) prizes must be larger than τ.
Among these top (n-1) prizes, since

ωj
mj

>

ωk
mk

for any j < k according to equation (6) and

g ′(r − τ ) is constant, the only solution to satisfy equilibrium condition (11) is n = 2 . That is,

the value-maximizing format of sweepstakes for low-valuation segment is to offer only one
level of prize that is larger than the opportunity cost τ. Moreover, following the same
argument as given in the high-valuation segment case, the value of sweepstakes is higher by
offering one grand price than offering multiple top prizes of the same level; that is, m1* =1.
Therefore, when low valuation consumers are risk neutral in gain, the value-maximizing
format of sweepstakes should not offer more than one big prize.
In addition to the grand prize, the value-maximizing sweepstakes for the lowvaluation segment also contains many small prizes equal to τ. Such a prize structure becomes
an equilibrium outcome if the marginal anticipated value from prize level τ is sufficiently
high for the low-valuation segment. According to (12), the sufficient condition for such a
prize structure to be value-maximizing is
l ′(0)

ω2
m2

≥ g ′(r1 − τ )

w1
1

(13)

This condition holds when the low-valuation consumers are sufficiently loss averse.
Now we analyse what the size of the first prize (r1) and number of small-prize
winners (m2) should be for the type of sweepstakes proposed above for low-valuation
segment. In Appendix 2 we derive the equilibrium condition for the value-maximizing
number of small-prize winners:
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( )

1
1 + m *2  ω N g ′(r1* − τ )
′


=
ω
N 
l (τ )
1N


(14)

τ

 1 + m *2
In equation (14), the marginal decision weight ω ′
 N


 decreases with m2, slope ω (1 N )

1N


increases with the SA of the decision weighting function, and ratio

g ′(r1* )
l (τ ) τ

decreases with loss

aversion and increases with opportunity cost τ. Therefore, the number of small-prize winners
(m2) should increase with loss aversion but decrease with the size of opportunity cost (τ) and
SA of the decision weighting function. Since the size of first prize decreases with number of
small-prize winners, we can infer that the spread between the first prize and small prize
should decrease with loss aversion but increase with SA of the decision weighting function.
The results of the above analysis on the value-maximizing structure of sweepstakes
for low-valuation consumers lead to the following proposition.

Proposition 2.1:

(a) If the low-valuation segment is risk neutral with respect to gain and sufficiently loss
averse, then the value-maximizing prize structure for the sweepstakes should consist of a
grand prize and many small prizes equal to τ. That is, s L* = {r1* , m *1 = 1; r 2* = τ , m *2 } .
(b) In a value-maximizing sweepstakes, the number of small-prize winners ( m 2* ) increases
with loss aversion and decrease with Sub-Additivity of the decision weighting functions.
Impact of Risk Aversion in Gain Function
We now analyse the implications of risk aversion in gain on the design of sweepstakes for the
low-valuation segment. The degree of risk aversion in gain is measured by the concavity of
gain function with respect to the amount of gain that a low-valuation consumer receives from
winning the sweepstakes. Similar to the analysis for the high-valuation consumers who are
risk averse, low-valuation consumers who are risk averse may also prefer sweepstakes that
offer multiple levels of prizes above switching cost τ. That is, condition (11) may hold for
multiple levels of prizes above switching cost τ. On the one hand,

ωj
mj

>

ω j +1
m j +1

still holds for

any j due to the s-shaped decision weighting function. This is tempered by the risk averseness
in gain with the marginal value from gain g ′(r j − τ ) < g ′(r j +1 − τ ) for r j > r j +1 . Thus, necessary
condition (11) can hold for multiple levels of rewards.
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To design a sweepstake that offers multiple levels of prizes, the firm needs to decide
the number of winners for each rank of prize {m1 , m2 ,..., mn } and inter-rank spread. As in the
analysis for the high-valuation consumers, we find that value-maximizing number of winner
for each rank of prize (above τ) is one. The intuition behind this result is same as discussed
for high-valuation segment. In essence, the concavity of the value function and the s-shape of
the decision weighting function determine that two different prizes are more effective than
one big prize of the same amount. In summary, the value-maximizing format for the top (n-1)
prizes is to offer a single prize at many levels.
When a sweepstakes offers many single prizes, equilibrium condition (11) becomes
j
j −1 

)  g ′(r j* − τ ) = M *L (j = 1,2,..n-1)
ω ( ) − ω (
N
N



(15)

for j = 1,2,..n-1. Condition (15) implies that, given the decision weighting function, when
low-valuation consumers are more risk averse, they prefer a sweepstake of smaller inter-rank
spread (rj - rj+1) and larger number of winners. Moreover, given a fixed level of risk aversion,
when decision-weighting function is more sub-additive (SA), a sweepstake that has larger
inter-rank spread for the top prizes and fewer number of winners provides maximum value.
The number of last-prize winners also changes with consumer risk aversion. We
derive the equilibrium condition for value-maximizing number of winners in Appendix 2 as
follows:
ω  j N  − ω  j − 1 N  g ′(r − τ )
 n − 1 + m *n 
j



= 
ω ′
N
τ
l
(
)
1
N



(j=1,2,…n-1)

(16)

τ

We can infer from condition (16) that the number of last-prize winners increase with loss
aversion but decrease with the size of switching cost. Moreover, the number of last-prize
winners increases with the low-valuation consumers’ risk aversion.

Proposition 2.2:

(a) If low-valuation consumers are risk averse, the value-maximizing sweepstakes should
consist of multiple big prizes and many small prizes equal to τ.
(b) The number of prizes that are larger than opportunity cost τ should increase but the interrank spread decrease with degree of consumer risk aversion.
(c) The number of winners of last prize should increase with loss aversion and risk aversion,
but decrease with the size of switching cost and SA of decision weighting function.
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The major distinction between the designs of sweepstakes targeted towards the highvaluation vs. low-valuation segment is that the reward structure should include more and
smaller amount prizes for the latter. A sweepstakes that offers many small prizes to the lowvaluation consumers efficiently reduces the anticipated loss resulting from switching from
her preferred brands. This is unnecessary for a sweepstakes that targets the high-valuation
consumers.
The implication of risk aversion is that consumers prefer sweepstakes that offer a
number of large prizes rather than just one grand prize. This pattern should be the same for
both high-valuation segment and low-valuation segment. However, for a sweepstakes that
targets low-valuation consumers, when the level of loss aversion is high, the number of small
prizes should be increased to maximize consumers’ valuation. Thus, in addition to offering
multiple large prizes rather than just one grand prize, increased number of small prizes also
leads to a smaller chance for low-valuation consumers to experience a loss from participating
a sweepstakes.

Experimental Test

Testing the model based on behavior rather than stated preferences posed a challenge. As
conducting a field test to judge the effectiveness of alternative sweepstakes was not feasible,
an experimental method is employed to examine whether high valuation and low valuation
customers prefer the sweepstakes as suggested by the theoretical model. In addition, the
impact of risk aversion is also tested.

Subjects and Procedure
The subjects were 128 undergraduate business majors who participated to get extra course
credit. The task given to subject was to select between alternative sweepstakes. Subjects
were asked to imagine that they were at a grocery store where they could select between two
brands in four different product categories. Based on pre tests, two product categories were
selected that met two criteria (a) students usage rates of the product categories were high and
(b) there were two brands that constituted a major market share in the subject population. The
categories and brands selected were Toothpaste (Crest/Colgate) and Colas (Diet Pepsi/Diet
Coke). We use two product categories to check for consistency of results. As the stimuli for
the two focal product categories was quite similar, subjects were also responded to
sweepstakes for two other categories: Peanut Butter (Jif /Skippy) and Canned Tuna (Bumble

http://services.bepress.com/roms/vol1/iss3/paper2

20

Kalra and Shi: Consumer Value-Maximizing Sweepstakes & Contests

Bee/Chicken of the Sea) where the sweepstakes stimuli were different from the designs that
are the focus of this study.
Subjects were given a booklet (Questionnaire 1) where their relative preference for
the two brands in the product category was elicited using a 15-point scale anchored between
Strongly Prefer Brand X-Will Never Consume Brand Y to Strongly Prefer Brand Y-Will
Never Consume Brand X where the mid point (8) indicated indifference between the two
brands. Thus, responses from 1-7 reflected preference for Brand X with 1 showing a strong
preference for Brand X. Responses from 9-15 reflected preference for Brand Y with 15 an
indicator of strong preference for Brand Y. To illustrate the experimental procedure, we use
the example of the toothpaste category. Subjects were asked to imagine that they had a
choice of either purchasing Crest or of purchasing Colgate. They were told that Colgate was
running a sweepstake promotion where different packages had different sweepstakes in that
the odds of winning a prize varied. The subjects were asked to look at the (five) options
available to them that included buying Crest that had no sweepstake or one of the four
Colgate packages. Each Colgate package had a different sweepstake promotion. The stimuli
of the alternative sweepstakes is provided in Table 1. The sweepstakes in Tube 1 is designed
as a single grand prize, Tube 2 multiple large prizes, Tube 3 is multiple large prizes and
several small prizes while Tube 4 is a grand prize with several small prizes.
Subjects were asked to rank order the five alternatives in order of preference5.
However, we use only data of the most preferred option. It is important to note that the task
was entirely incentive compatible. There is no a priori theoretical reason to suggest that the
rank order task causes any preference reversal as compared to a simple choice decision.
After subjects completed their responses for the sweepstakes in the four product
categories, they were given a filler task. The filler task consisted of evaluating
advertisements and took approximately 25 minutes. After completing the filler task, subjects
were handed another booklet (Questionnaire 2) where their sweepstakes preferences were
elicited again in a manner identical to the first task except that the brand with the sweepstakes
promotion was switched (e.g. Crest had the identical sweepstakes to that in Questionnaire 1
whereas Colgate had no sweepstake). The questionnaires were counterbalanced to eliminate
order effects. At the end of the task, measures of risk aversion were obtained using certainty
equivalence questions. Risk aversion was assessed by responses to four questions (see, for
example, Johnson & Schkade 1989). Two of the questions were framed in terms of gains and
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two in terms of losses. In the first two questions, the subjects were asked to indicate how
much they were willing to receive a sure payment for a gamble that had a 0.5 (0.3) chance of
winning $200 ($160) and 0.5 (0.7) chance off getting $ 0($75). In the domain of losses,
subjects were asked to indicate what they were willing to pay to give away a gamble that
offered a 0.3 (0.5) chance of losing $200 ($90) and a 0.7 (0.5) chance of losing $415 ($210).
To ensure that the subjects took the task seriously, they were told that they would
play one of the alternative sweepstakes for real based on their decisions and were also given
the product. For each product category, bags containing cards with winning odds as in the
stimuli were placed in view of the students. After completing both questionnaires, subjects
approached the experimenter where they first drew a card that contained the name of the
product category and questionnaire (first or second) that they would play for real money.
After the category and questionnaire number were determined, the experimenter tossed a
coin. If the subject called correctly, subjects played got their first choice in the product
category and questionnaire they had drawn. If the subject called incorrectly, the coin was
tossed gain until the subject called correctly. Recall that the subjects rank-ordered five
options. If the subject called incorrectly 4 times, they were asked to play their last choice.
Based on the drawing obtained by the subject, they were given the corresponding sweepstake
to play. Finally, the subjects were paid, given the brand of the option they played and
debriefed. Thus, for the toothpaste category, if subjects played their first choice indicated in
Questionnaire 1, they were given a tube of Colgate toothpaste and played the Colgate
sweepstakes (or were given Crest without playing if that was their first choice).

Results
Eight subjects did not provide completed surveys and were dropped from the analysis. Two
adjustments were made in the sample that are included in the analysis. First, it was observed
that the sweepstakes choices of subjects who were indifferent between the two brands varied
systematically. This was due to the fact that subjects who were indifferent between the two
brands either were loyal users of a third brand or were switchers between the two major
brands. We therefore dropped the subjects who were loyal to alternative brands. Second, the
first choice of some subjects was to get their preferred brand and not participate in the
sweepstakes. These subjects are also not included in the results presented.

5

Due to the financial and logistical costs involved in the experiment, a rank-ordered task was used to gather as
much information as possible for additional insights.
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The results of the preferred sweepstakes are provided in Table 2a. The percentages
reflect the most preferred sweepstake selected by the subjects. The subjects were categorized
as high valuation customers if the responses on the loyalty scale exceeded 10 or was below 6.
Responses between 6 and 10 on the 15-point scale were categorized as low-valuation
customers. Risk aversion was determined by aggregating the responses to the four certainty
equivalence questions. The top and bottom one-third of the subjects were categorized as the
low and high-risk averse subjects.
We first test whether there are any differences in the distribution of choices between
the four alternative sweepstakes that the subjects had to select from across the four conditions.
We begin with the analysis of the stimuli used for the toothpaste category and examine
whether the choices made by the high-valuation segment differ from those made by the lowbrand valuation segment. Within the subjects who are categorized as low risk averse, the
choices by the high-valuation segment are significantly different than the choice made by the
low-valuation segment ( χ 12,3 = 45.36, p < .001 ). Similarly, when the subjects were high risk

averse, the choices made by the high-valuation segment differ significantly from the lowvaluation segment ( χ 12,3 = 24.90 , p < .001 ). According to Proposition 1.1, the most effective
sweepstakes for the high valuation consumers who have low risk aversion is a single grand
prize. Consistent with the proposition, the grand prize only sweepstake is the most preferred
option with 52.10 % of the subjects selecting this option. Proposition 2.1 states that the
Grand Prize and multiple small prizes is the best sweepstake if the target are consumers with
low-brand valuation and high risk aversion. Also, consistent with the prediction, 59.02 % of
the subjects selected this sweepstake.
Now we examine the results when consumers differ in terms of their risk aversion.
Within the high-brand valuation condition, there is a significant difference in choices
between the low and high risk averse subjects ( χ 12,3 = 50.46 , p < .001 ). Similarly, there is
also a significant difference between the low and high-risk averse subjects when the valuation
of brands is low ( χ 12,3 = 23.87, p < .001 ). For consumers who have high brand valuation but
are risk averse, the most effective sweepstake according to Proposition 1.2 is to have multiple
prizes. However, this option was selected by 36.13 % of the subjects in contrast to 36.97 %
of the subjects who selected Grand Prize+Small prize option. Similarly, in the high-risk
averse condition where subjects had low-brand valuations, the predicted Multiple Large
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Prize+Small prize sweepstake was selected by 39.13 % of the subjects as compared to 40.00
% who selected the Grand Prize+Small option.
The results for the Cola category provide stronger support for the model. As in the
toothpaste category, comparison of the choices made by the high-valuation segment and the
low-valuation segment reveals differences. The distribution of choices made by the highvaluation and low-valuation are significantly different in the low risk averse condition
( χ 12,3 = 70.19 , p < .001 ) as well as in the high risk averse condition ( χ 12,3 = 15.58, p < .01 ).
As predicted by Proposition 1.1, the Grand Prize only sweepstake is most preferred (62.86 %)
by the high-brand valuation segment that has low risk aversion. Also, as predicted by
Proposition 2.1, the Grand Prize+Small Prize sweepstake is the modal pick (58.65 %) for the
high-brand valuation high-risk averse segment.
The results reveal that the level of risk aversion also has an impact on choices. The
choices made by the high-brand valuation segment are significantly different between the
low-risk averse and high risk-averse segment ( χ 12,3 = 75.20 , p < .001 ) as are the choices
made by the low-brand valuation segment between the risk aversion conditions
( χ 12,3 = 23.68, p < .001 ). As predicted by Proposition 1.2, the Multiple Prize sweepstake is
most preferred (35.71 %) as predicted when the subjects have high-brand valuations but are
risk averse. In the high-risk averse condition where the brand valuation is low, the most
preferred sweepstake is Multiple Prize+Small Prizes (43.12 %) which is consistent with the
prediction of Proposition 2.2. The difference in results between the toothpaste and the cola
categories can be explained by the difference in the stimuli. Note that the stimuli for the
Multiple Prize+Small Prizes in the cola category has a small spread between the prizes than it
does in the toothpaste category.
The experiment finds strong support for Propositions 1.1 and 2.1. The results are
directionally correct in support of Propositions 1.2 and 2.2 particularly for sweepstakes
conducted for the cola category. A limitation of the experiment may account for the lack of
similarly strong results for Propositions 1.2 and 2.2. Note that an infinite number of prize
structures can be created for the ‘multiple prize’ category of sweepstakes. It is likely that the
reward structure created was not the ‘value-maximizing’ one for the subject population. In
the cola stimuli, there are more prizes in the ‘multiple’ prizes sweepstakes suggesting that the
toothpaste stimuli was further away from the ‘value-maximizing’ reward structure.
Therefore, even directional results can be viewed as quite encouraging. Another limitation of
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the experiment is that subjects did not pay for the products. Finally, subjects selected
between several sweepstakes whereas brands offer only one option 6.
Overall, the experiment finds strong support for the sweepstake preferences predicted
by the model when consumers vary in their valuations of the product and when they are not
risk averse. In the case of high-risk aversion, the experiment finds directional support. We
view this result not as a limitation of the model but rather in the implementation of the ‘best’
sweepstake design for the high-risk averse subject population.

Conclusion

Sweepstake and contests are commonly used as a promotional tool and the incidence
of usage has been growing. Firms also devote large budgets to communicate the promotion
to consumers. The purpose of this paper is to provide guideline on designing sweepstakes
that will increase consumers’ motivation to participate and thus generate additional sales.
The results of the model show that the sweepstakes reward structure should be based on three
factors: the objectives of the firm, the risk aversion of the customers and the level of subadditivity. The results of the model prescribes that the firm should begin by setting
sweepstake objectives in terms of either attracting switchers or targeting current users. If the
objective is to target current users, then the number of prizes awarded should be lower than in
the case where the targets are switchers. If the current users are risk neutral, then the
consumer value-maximizing award is a single grand prize. If the current users are risk
averse, then the award should consist of multiple “large” prizes. When the firm’s objective
is to draw sales away from competitors, the value-maximizing strategy is to distribute the
award money over more prizes. If the non-current user segment is risk neutral with respect
to gains but sufficiently risk averse in the domain of losses, then the prescribed reward
structure is to have a single grand prize but also include several small prizes which ideally
should be close to the opportunity cost of the customers. If the non-loyal customers are risk
averse in gain and loss averse, then the best prize allocation is to have both multiple large
prizes as well as several small prizes.
Another recommendation from the model analysis is that the firm should minimize
the number of prizes at each level. In practice, the costs of implementing and communicating
such a prize structure could be high. To trade-off between the logistical and communication

6

Note that a field test will be required to gather data where subjects view only one sweepstakes.
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costs and the theoretically value-maximizing approach, firms could increase the number of
prizes at each level for easier implementation. A trade-off is involved between increasing the
attractiveness of the sweepstake and the implementation costs of administering several levels
of prizes. Often, when the prizes are products rather than cash, the firm may obtain quantity
discounts for the products but the value of the products will be the same for the sweepstake
participants.
An implicit assumption in the model is that the opportunity cost of switching brands
also is homogenous. This is a major assumption but the implications when the assumption
does not hold are also clear from the analysis. The firm needs to segment the low valuation
consumers in terms of the amount of opportunity cost and then calculate the relative size of
each segment. If the segment size is skewed towards high opportunity costs, the size of the
smaller prizes needs to be increased. However, if the segment is skewed towards smaller
opportunity costs, the smaller prizes should be of a lower amount. Another implicit
assumption made in the analysis is that the level of customer risk aversion is homogenous. If
the customers are heterogenous, then the firm should measure the extent of risk aversion and
the degree of heterogeneity. Under certain conditions such as when there is a large segment
of risk averse consumers, it is profitable to increase the level of prizes.
A factor that impacts the value-maximizing reward structure is the degree of subadditivity. It is important that future research investigate the sweepstake design factors that
affect subadditivity. As mentioned earlier, creating illusion of control by increasing the effort
required to participate may be a fruitful avenue for future research. The effort levels can be
thought of as either being incorporated in the game itself or in terms of effort required to
submit the entry forms. Other potential factors likely to influence subadditivity that require
further research are the degree of brand loyalty and whether the product is immediately
consumed or if the consumption is delayed.
Another avenue for future research is to examine which of these two formats is more
effective in generating additional sales and the conditions under which one approach will be
superior to the other. Under certain conditions (e.g. products positioned as niche brands),
consumers may under or over-estimate sweepstake participation rates thereby changing the
perceived attractiveness of the contest. Several other formats of sweepstakes also deserve
attention in future research. One format is a combination of risk prospects and uncertainty
where the odds of winning a prize is provided but the specific odds of winning specific prizes
are not. For example, in 2000, Folgers Coffee conducted a sweepstake where they
announced what the prizes were but only specified that the odds of winning a prize was 1 in
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7. Another format are sequential contests where the initial prize is a small fixed amount but
the winners have the opportunity to play for larger amounts in subsequent rounds either as a
sweepstake or based on skill (e.g. Beck’s 2 million Deutsche Marks Golf Putt Sweepstake).
Though sweepstakes are used very frequently, there is no evidence how this
promotional tool is more effective than others. It is important to identify the conditions under
which sweepstakes are better than other options available to managers. Clearly, sweepstakes
do not possess the disadvantage of reducing brand equity through price discounts. Also, it is
likely that advertising the sweepstakes may attract more consumer attention than other forms
of promotions. However, little is known regarding the relative benefits of sweepstakes and
the conditions and/or segments they are likely to have more impact. Given the large
expenditures incurred in sweepstakes, these issues merit future research.
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Table 1
Sweepstake Choices (Toothpaste Category)

Buy Colgate:
_____ Tube 1 $ 200 Grand Prize(1)

1 out of 200 tubes contains the winning
number for $ 200

_____ Tube 2: $ 10 Prize (20)

20 out of 200 tubes contain the winning
number for $ 10

_____ Tube 3: $100 Grand Prize(1)

1 out of 200 tubes contains the winning
number for $ 100
50 out of 200 tubes contain the
winning number for $ 2

$ 2 First Prize (50)

_____ Tube 4: $ 5 First Prize (20)
$ 2 Second Prize (50)

20 out of 200 tubes contain the winning
number for $ 5
50 out of 200 tubes contain the
winning number for $ 2

_____ Buy Crest

Sweepstake Choices (Cola)

Buy Diet Pepsi:
_____ Can 1: $ 175 Grand Prize (1)

1 out of 300 tubes contains the winning
number for $ 175

_____ Can 2: $ 25 Grand Prize (1)

1 out of 300 tubes contains the winning
number for $ 25
30 out of 300 cans contain the
winning number for $ 5

$ 5 First Prize (30)

_____ Can 3 $ 75 Grand Prize(1)
$ 1 Prize (100)

_____ Can 4: $ 2.00 (50)
$ 0.75 (100)

1 out of 300 cans contains the winning
number for $ 75
100 out of 300 cans contain the winning
number for $ 1
50 out of 300 cans contain the winning
number for $ 2.00
100 out of 300 cans contain the winning
number for $ 0.75

_____ Buy Diet Coke
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Table 2(a). Choice of Sweepstakes in Toothpaste Category

Brand Valuation
High

Low Risk
Aversion

Only Grand Prize
Multiple Prizes
Grand Prize & Small
Multiple & Small

Low

52.10 %
14.29 %
27.73 %
5.88 %

Only Grand Prize
Multiple Prizes
Grand Prize & Small
Multiple & Small
(n=122)

(n = 119)

High Risk
Aversion

Only Grand Prize
Multiple Prizes
Grand Prize & Small
Multiple & Small

18.85 %
4.10 %
59.02 %
18.03 %

10.08 %
36.13 %
36.97 %
16.81 %

Only Grand Prize
Multiple Prizes
Grand Prize & Small
Multiple & Small

8.70 %
12.17 %
40.00 %
39.13 %

(n=115)

(n = 119)

Table 2(b). Choice of Sweepstakes in Cola Category

Brand Valuation
High

Low Risk
Aversion

Only Grand Prize
Multiple Prizes
Grand Prize & Small
Multiple & Small

Low

62.86 %
5.71 %
23.81 %
8.40 %

Only Grand Prize
Multiple Prizes
Grand Prize & Small
Multiple+Small
(n=112)
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7.69 %
19.23 %
58.65 %
14.42 %

(n=104)

(n=105)

High Risk
Aversion

Only Grand Prize
Multiple Prizes
Grand Prize & Small
Multiple & Small

8.93 %
35.71 %
32.14 %
23.21 %

Only Grand Prize
Multiple Prizes
Grand Prize & Small
Multiple+Small

2.75 %
19.27 %
34.86 %
43.12 %

(n=109)
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Figure 1: Decision Weighting Functions
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Appendix 1. Sweepstakes for High-valuation Segment
Equilibrium condition
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We characterize value-maximizing sweepstakes based on equilibrium conditions. Let the
value-maximizing sweepstakes be S * = {r1* , m1* ; r 2* , m *2 ; ...r n* , m *n } . Consider a very small
amount of prize (∇r) reduced from rk* and allocated to r j* (1≤ j, k≤ n, j≠ k), while prizes of all
other ranks remaining the same. With total budget R fixed, rk* should decrease by

m j ∇r
mk

.

m
Therefore, drk dr = − j m . Such an allocation should not change anticipated value from
j
k
sweepstakes, that is,

ω j
ω
dr
dV H ( S * )
g ′(r j* ) − k g ′(rk* ) = 0
(A1)
= ω j g ′(r j* ) + ω k g ′(rk* ) k = m j 
dr j
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mk

Equation (A1) leads to equilibrium condition for value-maximizing sweepstakes of (P2):
ωj
g ′(r j* ) = M *H ( j = 1,2,..n)
(A2)
mj

Proof there is only one winner at each rank when salespeople are risk averse in gain
Suppose there are two winners at jth rank for prize r j . Consumer’s anticipated value from this
rank of prize is equal to
   j −1
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For a positive and sufficiently small σ, we can reallocate prize (2 r j ) into ( r j -σ) and ( r j +σ),
keeping other prizes and their associated decision weights unchanged. With such a change in
prize structure, the anticipated value from these two prizes become
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Then the change in anticipated value of sweepstakes resulting from prize reallocation is
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In (A3), according to equation (6), ω   ∑ mk + 1 N  − ω  ∑ mk N  is larger than

 k =1

  k =1

  j −1

  j −1



ω   ∑ mk + 2  N  − ω   ∑ mk + 1 N  . Moreover, the difference is strictly positive and


  k =1

  k =1

independent of σ. On the other hand, when σ becomes smaller, the difference between
(g (rj ) − g (rj − σ ) ) and (g (rj + σ ) − g (rj ) ) decreases and eventually approaches to zero.
Therefore, there exists a positive and sufficiently small σ* so that (A3) is positive for any
0<σ<σ*. In other words, the firm can increase the anticipated value of sweepstakes
promotion by reallocating (2 r j ) into ( r j -σ) and ( r j +σ) as long as σ is small enough. Thus, it
is not value-maximizing to have a rank with more than one winner. Instead, only a single
winner should be awarded for every level of prize.
Appendix 2: Sweepstakes for Low-valuation Segment
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Proof that the lowest prize should be at least as large as opportunity cost τ.
Suppose a sweepstake S includes a prize smaller than opportunity cost τ. Without loss of
n

generality, we let S = {r1 , m1 ; r2 , m2 ; ...; rn , mn } where rn m n = Rn , ∑ m j r j = R , and rn < τ .
j =1

Now we show that under the same budget (R), we can enhance the valuation of sweepstakes
with an increase in lowest reward rn . Keeping {r1 , m1 ; r2 , m2 ; ...; rn −1 , mn −1 } the same, we let
rn increase by a very small amount while keeping Rn (hence total expense R) unchanged.
With a constant Rn , since m n = Rn r , an increase in rn implies a decrease in m n . An increase
n

in rn will lead to following changes in the low-valuation consumers’ anticipated value from
sweepstakes participation:
∂V L ( S ) ∂ω n
[− l (τ − rn )] + ω n l ′(τ − rn ) + ∂ω n [l (τ )]
=
∂rn
∂rn
∂rn
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due to the s-shaped decision weighting function, and b) l ′(τ − rn ) >
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The above inequality always holds because a)

j =1

∑

j =1

∂VL ( S )
> 0 , sweepstakes valuation can be enhanced
∂rn
with an increase in rn . Therefore a sweepstakes S = {r1 , m1 ; r2 , m2 ; ...; rn , mn } with rn < τ is
not value-maximizing. The lowest prize in value-maximizing sweepstakes should be at least
as large as opportunity cost τ.
concavity of the loss function. Since

Equilibrium Condition
As in Appendix 1, we characterize value-maximizing sweepstakes based on equilibrium
conditions. Let the value-maximizing sweepstakes be S * = {r1* , m1* ; r 2* , m *2 ; ...r n* , m *n } . Since the

smallest prize should be as large as τ, we let rn* =τ. We now consider a very small amount of
prize (∇r) deducted from rk* and allocated to r j* (1≤ j, k≤ n, j≠ k), while prizes of all other
ranks remain the same. With total budget R fixed, rk* should increase by
drk

dr j

=−

mj
mk

m j ∇r
mk

. Therefore,

. Anticipated value from sweepstakes would then change by:
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dr
ω
dV L ( S * )
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g ′(r j* − τ ) − k g ′(rk* − τ ) = 0 (j, k ≠ n) (A5)
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Equation (A5) characterizes equilibrium condition for first (n-1) prizes,
ωj
g ′(r j* − τ ) = M *L ( j = 1,2,..n-1)
mj

(A8)

Similar to (A2), (A8) requires identical anticipated value generating ability M *L from
the top (n-1) prizes. At the bottom prize that equals to switching cost τ, anticipated value is
not differentiable because of loss aversion. The value-maximizing sweepstakes contain a
bottom prize equal to τ if
ωn
ω
(A9)
l ′(0) ≥ M L* ≥ n g ′(0)
mn

mn

Condition (A9) ensures that reducing the lowest prize will reduce the anticipated value.
When low-valuation consumers are risk-averse in gain, (A8) and (A9) indicate that
the value-maximizing sweepstakes is to have multiple big prizes in addition to the bottom
prize equal to τ. Following exactly the same logic as given in second part of Appendix 1, we
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can show that number of winners for each rank of big prizes should be equal to one. Then the
equilibrium condition (A8) becomes:
j
j −1 

)  g ′(r j* − τ ) = M *L (j = 1,2,..n-1)
ω ( ) − ω (
N
N



(A10)

Value-maximizing number of lowest-prize winners
We now analyze the value-maximizing number of winners for the lowest prize (τ). Consider
a very small increase (∇m) in number of last-prize winners ( m n* ) and a decrease in r j* (1≤ j≤
n-1), while keeping prizes of all other ranks the same. To maintain the same total budget R,
r j* should decrease by τ∇m . Therefore,

∂r j

∂m n

= −τ . Such a reallocation should not change

the low-valuation consumers’ anticipated value of sweepstakes:
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Combining condition (A11) with (A10), we have the following equilibrium condition:
 ω  j  − ω  j − 1   g ′(r * − τ ) = l (τ )

  N
j
N  


τ
 

 n − 1 + m *n

ω ′


N



N


(j=1,2,…n-1)

which can be rewritten as
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l
(
)
1
N



(j=1,2,…n-1)

(A12)

τ
In the special case of low-valuation consumers being risk-neutral in gain, the valuemaximizing sweepstakes only offers one big prize; that is, n=2. Then condition (A12)
simplifies to:
1
1 + m *2  ω N g ′(r1* − τ )
 =
(A13)
ω ′
N
l (τ )
1N

τ

( )
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